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1.3 KiB
1.3 KiB
Malicious Package Investigation Report
📦 Package Metadata
- Package Name:
- Registry: [NPM / PyPI / RubyGems / etc.]
- Affected Versions:
- Malicious Version(s):
- Downloads at Time of Detection:
- Package URL:
🚩 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- Malicious URL(s):
- Exfiltrated Data Types: [Environment variables, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, /etc/shadow, etc.]
- Exfiltration Method: [DNS tunneling, HTTP POST to C2, etc.]
- C2 IP/Domain:
🛠️ Analysis Summary
- Primary Mechanism: [Typosquatting / Dependency Confusion / Maintainer Takeover]
- Behavior Description:
- [Example: Installs a postinstall script that exfiltrates environment variables.]
- [Example: Patches
setup.pyto download a secondary payload.]
🔍 Evidence Registry
| Evidence ID | Type | Source | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EV-XXXX | ioc | NPM | Package install script snapshot |
| EV-YYYY | web | Wayback | Historical version comparison |
🛡️ Recommended Mitigations
- Unpublish/Report the package to the registry.
- Audit
package-lock.jsonorrequirements.txtacross all projects. - Rotate secrets exfiltrated via environment variables.
- Pin specific hashes (SHASUM) for mission-critical dependencies.